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Introduction 
Is austerity over? Such claims have been made, hyperbolically, by Conservative 
chancellors since around 2014. It briefly appeared that the 2019 general election 
would see the UK political elite making good on this promise, as all main parties 
produced grand spending pledges. Yet the truth remains more complicated.  This 
article examines the near-future of UK austerity politics through the prism of the fiscal 
and welfare policies proposed in advance of the election. It finds the Conservative Party 
is largely where it has been since 2010, despite another change of leadership and the 
associated post-Brexit bluster. Can those in favour of reversing austerity at least look to 
the Labour opposition for a fresh approach? Yes and no. 
The politics of austerity 
Austerity in the UK after 2010 was always both less and more than acknowledged in 
general political discourse (Berry, 2016). Firstly, despite the coalition government’s pro-
austerity rhetoric, a radical programme of spending cuts was actually put on hold after 
initial reductions in 2010/11 destroyed the economy’s fragile recovery. There are 
exceptions to this pattern: principally local government, which has been systematically 
under-resourced in the past decade of Conservative rule. We can probably say the 
same about the National Health Service (NHS), whereby a commitment to maintain 
levels of expenditure was insufficient to match rising demand for healthcare. 
Benefit rates were also cut for the vast majority of existing and new recipients. Yet 
benefit expenditure actually increased, partly because of the protection of pensioner 
benefits, and partly because low wages and chronic under-employment led to higher 
claims for in-work benefits. With the partial exception of VAT, the coalition austerity 
agenda also encompassed a significant tax reduction agenda (primarily for private 
firms and middle-class households). A textbook application of austerity would consist of 
tax increases alongside spending cuts. 
Secondly, austerity served an ideological purpose instilling self-reliance among 
individuals, through engagement with financial services. ‘Asset-based welfare’ in the 
coalition era took the principal forms of encouraging saving in risky, individualised 
pension schemes, or subsidising indebtedness so that median earners could become 
home-owners. In both cases, higher public spending was required to achieve policy 
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aims – yet the narrative of austerity was employed to undermine the collectivist 
principles underpinning the welfare state and, to some extent, obscure the additional 
spending (Berry, 2014; Berry and Lavery, 2017; Montgomerie, 2019). There was a 
macro-economic imperative too: early coalition narratives around economic 
rebalancing and reducing household debt, as well as public debt, were quickly 
marginalised as it became clear that short-term growth continued to depend on 
consumer lending and the finance and real estate industries (Berry, 2016; Berry and 
Hay, 2016). 
While there is evidence that austerity was accepted in principle by large parts of the 
electorate (Stanley, 2016), there is little doubt that it became increasingly unpopular 
as its impact on local services and the NHS became evident.  Accordingly, both George 
Osborne and his successor as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, claimed 
to have completed the austerity project. Theresa May, as Prime Minister, associated a 
need to rethink austerity with her wider agenda on post-Brexit economic renewal 
(ostensibly a revival of the Liberal Democrats’ coalition-era industrial policies) (Berry, 
2019c). In reality, it was around this time that the pace of spending cuts accelerated, 
as the Cameron majority and May minority governments implemented Osborne’s 
postponed coalition-era cuts, particularly to public investment. 
The current chancellor, Sajid Javid, has made the same austerity-ending claim 
(Jordan, 2019) and, for a while, it seemed rather plausible. With plans for a National 
Infrastructure Fund (at a multi-year cost of £100 billion), and (questionable) claims on 
investment in hospital construction, the Resolution Foundation (RF) predicted in early 
November 2019 that public spending under a Conservative government would rise 
above 41 per cent of GDP by the end of the next parliament. This would take the UK 
back to the 1970s, effectively erasing the state-shrinking agendas of previous 
Conservative governments (Whittaker, 2019). Labour’s spending plans were projected 
to take spending above 43 per cent of GDP over the same period, owing to larger 
increases in public services expenditure, and an enormous uplift in capital investment 
through a National Transformation Fund focused around renewable energy. 
Born to rule 
By the time its manifesto was published at the end of November 2019, the Johnson 
government had significantly scaled back its spending plans. Additional current 
spending will amount to less than £3 billion per year, and additional capital spending 
around £8 billion per year, by the end of the parliament (compared to £83 billion on 
current spending alone under a Labour government, and even £63 billion under the 
Liberal Democrats) (Mason, 2019). What changed? We can probably point to the initial 
reaction to the Labour Party’s manifesto launch a week earlier, which centred on 
Labour’s plans to fund spending increases through borrowing – with the Conservatives 
seeking to emphasise the contrast between the two parties. A fuller answer to the 
question however, requires consideration of the fiscal rules that both main parties (and 
the Liberal Democrats, to an even greater extent) are promising to adhere to. 
The coalition government initially eschewed the application of fiscal rules such as 
those employed by Gordon Brown as Labour chancellor: Osborne knew that he could 
not effectively restrain borrowing, for example, without inflicting further unnecessary 
damage on the economic recovery. Instead, he opted for the illusion of fiscal constraint 
by establishing the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), a government agency which 
monitors the public finances, but has no formal power or even independence. The OBR 
simply judged the coalition’s record against their own stated deficit reduction 
objectives (Berry, 2016; Berry and Lavery, 2017). 
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The tune changed in 2015, when Osborne established strict spending controls via 
the Charter for Budget Responsibility, which ignored the advice of most 
macroeconomists by instituting limits to both current and capital expenditure, and 
committing the government to reduce borrowing each year (in ‘normal’ circumstances). 
The charter was designed to set a trap for the new Labour leadership; Osborne 
expected Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell to reject the rules because they imply 
near-permanent austerity – and thus undermine their credibility as stewards of the 
public finances in the eyes of the electorate. 
The 2016 Brexit vote interfered with this masterplan. Yet all parties continue to 
subscribe to the view that fiscal controls are an economic and/or political necessity. 
Consequently, even the proliferation of pre-election spending pledges was 
accompanied, paradoxically, by the pretence that there are limits to the public debt and 
budget deficits that might result (Berry, 2019a; Wren-Lewis, 2019). Both parties will 
aim to reduce debt, and debt interest payments. The main change to the limits 
concocted by Osborne is that now only deficits in the current budget – ignoring 
investment – will be targeted. 
There are two main differences between the rules proposed by Labour and the 
Conservatives. Firstly, while Labour has a rolling target for balancing the current budget 
– a five-year plan which resets each year – whereas the Conservative Party has a much 
tougher, fixed three-year target to eliminate the current budget deficit. Secondly, in 
relation to debt, Labour will adopt an approach whereby public assets are used to 
offset public liabilities – crucial if the nationalisation of some industries is to be 
deemed compatible with fiscal rules. It is worth noting that the Liberal Democrats’ 
proposed approach resembles Labour’s – yet their austerity pedigree is underlined by a 
commitment to targeting a permanent 1 per cent surplus in the current budget. 
The fiscal rules help us to understand why the Conservatives scaled back their 
public spending ambitions: Johnson’s promises would have jeopardised both the debt 
and deficit targets. Even if we view the targets as largely performative (which we 
probably should), nonetheless a pre-election forecast from, say, the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (duly amplified by the BBC) that disputed the Conservatives’ fiscal probity 
would also be part of the performance. There are two other relevant factors worth 
considering. Firstly, the Conservative Party is strongly committed to not increasing 
taxes (even pledging to cut National Insurance rates), whereas Labour has proposed 
sharp tax rises for some groups (see below), with the latter helping to fund increased 
current spending. Secondly, Brexit: calling a general election allowed the government to 
delay the budget statement, and therefore the publication of the first OBR fiscal 
forecasts since Johnson agreed a much ‘harder’ approach to EU withdrawal than the 
May government. Yet this reckoning will come (see UKICE, 2019). 
Crucially, Labour can ignore the potential fiscal impact of Brexit in its own 
proposals, since the party has yet to commit to any particular approach to leaving the 
EU. It argues, at worst, that the UK and EU will agree a trade deal which replicates all of 
the benefits of existing membership. Nevertheless, Labour remains keen to be judged 
as fiscally ‘responsible’ in rather narrow terms. A more radical approach to fiscal 
responsibility would be to adopt the New Economics Foundation’s approach to ‘fiscal 
space’, whereby constraints would only apply on the basis of evidence that fiscal 
expansion would have an adverse impact upon the economy (Stirling et al., 2019). 
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The state of welfare 
What does all of this mean for welfare? In relation to Conservative Party plans (2019a; 
2019b), the answer is simple: not a lot. There are no major policies announced, with 
only small additional spending allocated to support unpaid carers, and to extend the 
period before Personal Independence Payment (an out-of-work benefit for people with 
disabilities) eligibility is reassessed. The Universal Credit (UC) rollout is championed – 
which seems to imply support for the prospective application of the UC conditionality 
regime to in-work recipients (Jones et al., 2019). Austerity in the form of welfare 
retrenchment will not, in any sense, be reversed – and may indeed be advanced. 
Labour’s plans ask far more intriguing questions about the future of welfare 
provision (Labour Party, 2019a; 2019b). The most important point – overlooked by 
most sympathetic observers – is that Labour promises no reversal of austerity 
measures for the vast majority of benefit recipients. This is despite the fact that social 
security cuts by the coalition targeted the deindustrialised areas which comprise 
Labour’s traditional ‘heartlands’ (see Beatty and Fothergill, 2017). For the most part, 
coalition cuts are baked into the baseline. The most significant policy announcement 
by Labour is the abolition of UC – but this policy has not actually been costed, since it 
will only be developed once Labour is in office. 
Meanwhile, there will be a number of quite significant policy shifts on social security 
(all meticulously costed). The cuts to tax credits encapsulated by the UC system will be 
aborted, including the two-child limit. Employment and Support Allowance payments 
(for people with disabilities) will be increased, and PIP assessments reformed. Within 
Housing Benefit, the ‘bedroom tax’ will be scrapped, and Local Housing Allowance rates 
increased. The sanctions regime within Jobseeker’s Allowance, and the household 
‘benefits cap’, will also end. 
The impact of these changes would be progressive in relation to a continuation of 
Conservative rule. However, overall a Corbyn government would still be overseeing a 
social security regime significantly less generous than that developed by the Blair 
government (for working-age recipients). Arguably, however, Labour’s most ambitious 
plans for the welfare state are to be found elsewhere in its programme, insofar as they 
overlap with plans for public services investment. The planned nationalisation of 
broadband services and reintegration of higher education funding into the conventional 
education budget (by abolishing tuition fees, one way or another), for example, 
embrace the idea of ‘universal basic services’ (UCL-IGP, 2017) or ‘universal basic 
infrastructure’ (the other ‘UBI’; Barker et al., 2017). This suggests a reorganisation of 
welfare around universalist principles, benefiting all households rather than simply the 
worst off. No funds for universal basic income (the original UBI), which fits this mould, 
are allocated in the Labour manifesto – but a pilot project is promised. 
Is Labour’s caution (or conservatism) on social security a product of its commitment 
to current spending limits? Only partially. It is also a product of its caution on tax. For 
example, Labour has trumpeted its decision to increase taxes on the wealthiest 
individuals, but changes to income tax, and bringing wealth taxes in line with the 
income tax regime, are expected to raise only £5.4 billion and £14 billion per year 
(respectively) by 2023/24. Changes to corporation tax will lead to a higher yield of £30 
billion – yet firms will still be paying a lower rate than in 2010. 
As such, Despite expanding the welfare state to encompass new services for all 
households, the UK middle class – up to the 95th percentile of earners – will not be 
asked, in any direct sense, to support this agenda financially. The accusation that 
Labour’s redistributive agenda, as a result of largely protecting all but the top 5 per 
cent of working-age taxpayers, consists primarily of redistribution from the bottom (and 
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very top) to the middle (and beyond) is a little simplistic, but nonetheless 
understandable. In fact, According to analysis by RF of parties’ spending pledges that 
can be attributed to different income groups (a disclaimer, therefore: not all spending), 
the Liberal Democrats’ plans are slightly more progressive than Labour’s insofar as 
they will make the poorest households better-off, in terms of both cash and in-kind 
benefits. This is largely as a result of their proposals on supporting second-earners and 
the self-employed within UC, and a more substantive policy on subsidised childcare 
(Gardiner, 2019). Moreover, Labour has no substantial plans to support low-earners 
currently being enrolled into poor-quality workplace pensions – despite promising an 
estimated £12 billion per year to compensate women who claim to have been unjustly 
treated by plans to increase state pension age. This pledge (which, incredibly, is not 
included in the actual manifesto) represents the only measure by which Labour intends 
to actually reverse a coalition welfare cut for the recipients directly affected. Labour’s 
manifesto also does not include any direct measures to alleviate household 
indebtedness. 
Labour’s plans for fiscal policy are borne of a political calculation that middle-class 
voters will not tolerate an increased tax burden, perhaps blended with a little ‘modern 
monetary theory’ (which suggests, among other things, that tax is not primarily levied to 
fund government activities) (see Meadway, 2019 and Murphy, 2019). But they also 
arise, less directly, from a growing disconnection between Labour and working-class 
communities, which has led to universal services being prioritised over measures 
targeted to support low-income households. Labour’s Brexit policy is, ostensibly, a 
populist nod to perceived working-class preferences – but one which over-estimates 
pro-Brexit sentiment in Northern England, and which is based more generally upon a 
misunderstanding of working-class politics (Berry, 2018; Berry, 2019b). 
While both Labour’s and the Liberal Democrats’ welfare plans are progressive 
overall, under neither party would the rate of child poverty, for instance, actually fall as 
a direct consequence of their policies – rather both parties would simply mitigate 
expected increases, to around 30 per cent of children. Under a Conservative 
government, it will rise to 34 per cent (Gardiner, 2019). We should not discount the 
possibility that Labour’s wider economic agenda helps to reduce child poverty by 
improving household incomes via higher earnings: this assumption lies beneath 
Labour’s as-yet-unverifiable claim that it will eradicate in-work poverty within five years. 
While most austerity-related cuts will be left untouched (for now), arguably Labour’s 
investment programme is explicitly designed to rectify the economic damage wrought 
by austerity. In time – Brexit notwithstanding – the rising tide may well lift all boats.  
Nevertheless, for a party of the radical left not to produce a plan to significantly and 
immediately prevent almost one in three children from growing up in poverty, despite 
the ready availability of suitable fiscal levers and policy mechanisms, is difficult to 
forgive. But it is perhaps less difficult to understand, if we view the Labour offer not as 
a programme for a single term in office, but as a sketch of what a generation of Labour 
rule might deliver. New Labour’s success in addressing poverty and inequality was not 
only partial, it was also easy to unpick, as successive governments adjusted 
downwards the rates of an array of means-tested benefits, with limited opposition from 
middle-class groups (possessing political capital) given that they had not directly 
benefited from Labour’s social security policies. It may be that an initial focus on 
recasting the welfare state as a universal system benefiting all citizens lays the 
groundwork for a more redistributive agenda in future years. 
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Conclusion: austerity undead 
The notion that austerity will be resurrected depends, of course, on the pre-requisite 
that it had in fact died. There was a moment in mid/late 2019 when such a verdict felt 
plausible – but the moment quickly passed. That Boris Johnson et al. felt the need to 
indicate that spending on public services would increase substantially tells us 
something about the waning salience of austerity, but the UK political elite remains 
largely committed to the operation of fiscal constraints – whether based on an 
economic or political rationale. If, as expected at the time of writing, the Conservative 
Party is returned to government, the likely impact of Brexit on the public finances, in 
conjunction with strict fiscal rules, means austerity will remain a significant feature of 
the social and economic policy landscape, even if the concept’s ideological value 
weakens. 
In a sense, however, neither main party has ever fully embraced a conventional 
approach to fiscal tightening, insofar as they have resisted tax rises. While this is 
business-as-usual for the Conservative Party, it is rather more incongruous that a self-
consciously radical Labour leadership – with a transformative economic policy agenda 
– exhibits such reticence about tax adjustments for anybody but the top 5 per cent of 
earners. A failure to fully address the impact of austerity on benefits is one of the 
implications, and a likely failure to significantly reduce child poverty one of the highly 
regrettable consequences. Yet this commitment on tax may be one that neither party 
sticks to in office. A Conservative government may need to raise taxes to address the 
fiscal impact of Brexit. Similarly, a Labour government could well adopt the strategy 
that worked so well for the Blair and Brown governments; that is, increasing taxes mid-
term, once the salience of manifesto pledges declines (especially if the wider economic 
programme and new universalist approach to welfare fails to quickly increase living 
standards). 
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